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The Lost History
of the ILO’s Trade Sanctions
Steve Charnovitz*

I. Introduction
In 1994, the Report of the ILO Director-General declared that one of
the ‘premises’ on which the ILO is based is that it ‘should rely on cooper‑
ation rather than coercion in its efforts to promote social progress’.1 In line
with that premise, the Report observed that
the framers of the Constitution deliberately discarded all forms of coer‑
cion. Showing a great sense of realism, they concluded that recourse to
constraints or sanctions would only discourage States from ratifying
Conventions, or worse yet, from joining the Organization.2
When I read this statement in 1994 that the ILO’s framers had dis‑
carded coercion and sanctions, I knew it to be untrue because, several years
earlier, I had written about how the framers, in 1919, had placed trade sanc‑
tions into the ILO’s Constitution.3
Over the years, my writings have occasionally discussed the ILO’s orig‑
inal enforcement system. In 2001, I suggested that there are lessons to be



* This essay is dedicated to four individuals in the ILO community who, over the dec‑
ades, sought to enhance my understanding of the ILO’s past, present, and future – especially
Francis Maupain, and also to Abraham Katz, Virginia Leary, and Nicolas Valticos. My thanks
to José Alvarez for his thoughtful comments and to the participants at the seminar at the
University of Vienna Faculty of Law where a draft of this essay was presented.
1 
International Labour Conference, 81st Session (1994), Report of the Director General,
Defending values, promoting change – Social justice in a global economy: An ILO agenda, 58.
2
ibid 55.
3
Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Influence of international labour standards on the world
trading regime. A historical overview’ (1987) 126 International Labour Review 565, 576.
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learned from the lack of use of the ILO’s sanctions.4 A few years ago, I
showed how the ILO’s original dispute procedures had important impact
outside the ILO in serving as a model for dispute resolution in the world
trading system.5 But until recently, I had not looked closely at why the
endowed sanctions were not used.
The ILO’s experiment with trade sanctions receives little attention
in literature about the ILO. How did the trade sanctions for the ILO get
erased from its institutional memory? For many ILO scholars, the original
availability of trade sanctions was a bygone factoid to be overlooked in sim‑
plifying the portrayal of the ILO as an organization relying on voluntarism
and persuasion rather than coercion or teeth. Even as advocacy for using
trade sanctions to promote worker rights intensified in the late 20th and
early 21st centuries, those advocates were incurious as to what happened
with the ILO’s own trade sanctions.
Yet there has to be a good reason why an international organization
would leave unused in its toolbox the sanctioning mechanism specifically
designed to enforce its ratified standards. Reflecting on this puzzle last year
in the run-up to the ILO’s centenary, I looked again at the 1994 Report
which states that ‘sanctions’ have ‘been repeatedly discarded since the ILO’s
earliest days for pragmatic reasons’.6 I wondered what those episodes of
discarding were. So, I decided to search for and write up that lost history.
Given the space constraints of this volume, my essay will focus on the
early years of the ILO through 1934.7 Using two chronological narratives,
this essay will examine the rise and fall of ILO sanctions. The final sec‑
tion discusses the continuing relevance of the ILO’s adventure with its
trade sanctions.

4

Steve Charnovitz, ‘Rethinking WTO Sanctions’ (2001) 95 American Journal of
International Law 792, 831.
5
Steve Charnovitz, ‘What the World Trade Organization learned from the International
Labour Organization’ in Adelle Blackett and Anne Trebilcock (eds), Research Handbook of
Transnational Labour Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 411.
6
Report of the Director-General (n 1) 52.
7
For future scholars, let me note that I was not able to delve into the archives of the
ILO or the League and not able to access most non-English-language sources.
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II. The rise of ILO sanctions
Looking back from 1934, ILO founder Sir Malcolm Delevingne
observes that one of the ‘leading ideas embodied’ in the ILO Constitution
of 1919 is ‘supervision over, and enforcement of, the observance’ of ILO con‑
ventions.8 Delevingne explains that the idea of enforcement by the ILO can
be traced back to earlier intergovernmental labour negotiations including
the British government’s unsuccessful proposals for enforcement through
arbitration offered at the Berne diplomatic conference of 1906.9
In 1918, as the Great War draws to a close, both the French and
British governments seek to create an international organization focusing
on labour.10 Unlike the institutional caution in 1906, this time there is
agreement on the need for an international arrangement with enforcea‑
bility. The French government’s proposal is that the Conference of the new
organization ‘will supervise the enforcement of Conventions which have
been accepted’ and will settle disputes either itself or through a Court of
Arbitration.11 The British government’s proposal is an intricate framework
of what becomes the ILO. Known as the ‘Early British Draft’, this frame‑
work provides a ‘complaint’ process against ‘inadequate enforcement’ of ILO
conventions because ‘otherwise countries might obtain unfair advantage in
industrial competition through lax administration of the international
standards’.12 Penalties are to be available against ‘non-observance’, but the
British Draft maintains that it is ‘undesirable to provide an excessive pen‑
alty’ for a ‘comparatively trifling offence’.13 On the other hand, for a failure
to carry out ‘a convention designed to prevent oppressive conditions’, the

8

Sir Malcolm Delevingne, ‘The Pre-War History of International Labor Legislation’
in James T. Shotwell (ed), The Origins of the International Labor Organization (Columbia
UP 1934) vol I, 19, 41-52. In 1919, Sir Malcolm was an Assistant Under Secretary in the
British Home Office with extensive experience in improving British workplace regulation.
9
The Berne conference adopted the first two multilateral labour conventions – on
phosphorus matches and night work for women in industry.
10
By 1918, the concept of the functional international organization had deep roots
in international law going back to the scholarship of University of Vienna Professor Georg
Jellinek in 1889.
11
Letter from the French Minister of Labour (December 1918) Document 21 in
Shotwell (n 8) vol II, 97, 105.
12
Early British Draft, Document 25 in Shotwell (n 8) vol II, 124.
13
ibid 125.
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British Draft suggests that the appropriate penalty would be for signatory
States ‘to discriminate against the articles produced under the conditions of
unfair competition proved to exist unless those conditions are remedied’.14
At the end of January 1919, the Preliminary Peace Conference
appoints a Commission on International Labour Legislation (the Labour
Commission) to prepare detailed recommendations on labour. Nine coun‑
tries are represented on the Commission whose delegates are drawn mainly
from governments. But for some of the countries, delegates (or substitutes)
are also drawn from industry, labour and academia.15 In an early decision,
the Labour Commission agrees to use the ‘Draft Convention’ formulated
by the British government as a vehicle for discussion.16
The Draft Convention provides that when a ‘complaint’ arises from a
contracting party that another party is not ‘securing the effective obser‑
vance’ of an ILO Convention, ‘the Governing Body shall apply for the
appointment of a Commission of Enquiry’ to consider the complaint and
report thereon on ‘steps which should be taken to meet the complaint and
the time within which they should be taken’.17 In addition, the Commission
of Enquiry18 is directed to indicate in its report the measures, if any, ‘against
the commerce’ of a defaulting State which it considers to be appropriate, and
which other States would be justified in adopting.19 Should the defaulting
State not accept the recommendations of the Commission, the defaulting
State would have a right to refer the matter to the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ). The role of the Court is to ‘affirm, vary or
reverse any of the findings or recommendations of the Commission of
14

ibid.
Several of the Commission’s main players had collaborated with each other for years
in international labour circles; see Jasmien Van Daele, ‘Engineering Social Peace: Networks,
Ideas, and the Founding of the International Labour Organization’ (2005) 50 International
Review of Social History 435, 451–52.
16
Minutes of Proceeding No. 2, Second meeting of the Commission on International
Labour Legislation, Official Bulletin (OB) (1919-20) I 8.
17
Draft Convention, ibid 13-14, articles 24 and 27.
18
By 1919, the Commission of Enquiry is already part of international law machinery.
Yet the ILO Commission is assigned broader duties than earlier commissions had. Cesare
P.R. Romano, ‘The ILO system of Supervision and Compliance Control: A Review and
Lessons for Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (1996) Vienna International Institute
for Applied System, 11, 14.
19
Draft Convention (n 17) article 27.
15
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Enquiry’, and the Court may indicate the ‘measures, if any, against the
commerce’ of the defaulting State which the Court considers to be appro‑
priate, and which other States would be justified in adopting.20 Should the
defaulting State fail to comply, any other State would be authorized to take
‘against the commerce’ of the defaulting State the ‘measures indicated’ by
the Commission or the Court.21
In the ensuing debate within the Labour Commission, the most active
delegates make several important observations. Ernest Mahaim, a law pro‑
fessor at the University of Liège (Belgium) and the principal organizer nearly
20 years earlier of the International Association of Labour Legislation, warns
that the ‘economic sanctions’ in the British Draft have a ‘danger of encour‑
aging protectionist measures’ (17).22 Léon Jouhaux, the Secretary-General of
the French General Confederation of Labour, praises the sanctions as being
‘of supreme importance’ (66). Emile Vandervelde, the Belgian Minister of
Justice and former President of the Second International, emphasizes that
it ‘was not a question of measures to compel a State to accept international
labour legislation, but only of sanctions against Governments which, having
ratified a Convention, failed to honour their word’ (66). Vandervelde also
points out that Belgian employers are ‘somewhat alarmed by the fact that
no scales of penalties had been provided’ (66). George Barnes, a Scottish
parliamentarian and member of the British War Cabinet, notes the proce‑
dural value of providing a ‘Court of Appeal open to defaulting States […]
before the economic sanctions […] could become operative’ (66).
Several delegates advance amendments. Vandervelde proposes that
in addition to complaints from contracting parties, complaints should
also be allowed from delegates to the ILO Conference (62, 64). Another
Vandervelde amendment recognizes the need for ‘sanctions’23 and ‘penal‑
ties’, but proposes a wording change from ‘measures against the commerce’

20

ibid article 31. The Court’s decision is to be ‘final’ meaning no further judicial review;
ibid article 30.
21
ibid article 32.
22
I will include the page references in parentheses to the Commission’s Minutes repub‑
lished in OB (n 16).
23
The term ‘sanctions’ does not appear in the English version of Part XIII of the Treaty
of Versailles, but the French version uses the term ‘les sanctions’; Treaty of Versailles, 28 June
1919, 112 British and Foreign State Papers 1, articles 414, 418-419.
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to ‘measures of an economic character’ (66, 68). Both amendments suc‑
ceed. In a subsequent session, a British amendment is accepted to grant
the Governing Body discretion as to whether to utilize a Commission of
Enquiry (109, 124).
As the debate proceeds, Arthur Fontaine, the Director of the French
Ministry of Labour, offers slightly broader language for the potential pen‑
alties. Mahaim responds that the Belgian delegation opposes ‘protectionism
of a penal character’ and therefore urges that ‘recourse should be had to pen‑
alties of an economic character (financial tariffs, transit facilities, etc.), but
barring any penalty of a military character’ (125). Delevingne explains that
the term ‘penalties of an economic character’ has a ‘very wide application,
and included all measures affecting the economic life of a country’ (125).
After hearing those points, Fontaine drops his amendment, but avows that
the agreed-upon text ‘would of course not exclude the possibility of inserting
in a Convention clauses establishing a system of fines in the case of viola‑
tion’ (125).
Henry Robinson, a lawyer-banker and United States delegate to the
Allied Supreme Economic Council, proposes several amendments affecting
obligations and sanctions. One amendment seeks to devolve the United
States treaty obligation internally to the individual state governments
(73‑74). Against that amendment, Fontaine objects that ‘it was difficult to
see what form of economic sanction could be applied against any of them
which failed to carry out a Convention’ (74). Another Robinson amend‑
ment seeks to water down the United States commitment to merely a ‘best
endeavour’ to obtain compliance at the subnational level (88). Delevingne
objects that this could free a federal State ‘from all liability, while the other
States remained subject to the application of the clauses concerning enquiry
and penalties’ (91).
As part of the United States ‘counter-draft’, Robinson then proposes
‘to delete the whole system of penalties’ as being ‘superfluous’ and ‘dan‑
gerous’, and instead leave the ‘application of penalties to the League of
Nations’ (150). Speaking in favor of this amendment, James Shotwell, a
history professor at Columbia University, warns that with the availability
of ‘penalties’, there is ‘a risk of going too far and creating too many organiza‑
tions, for what was done for labour might equally be done as regards other
questions’ (153). Speaking against the United States amendment, Fontaine
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declares that ‘he was convinced that as regards international legislation it
would rarely be necessary to have recourse to penalties; all the same it was
necessary that they should be provided as the very basis of international
legislation’ (154). The American Federation of Labor President Samuel
Gompers, who is the president of the Labour Commission, intervenes to
suggest that several clauses, including ‘the clauses dealing with penalties’
are ‘imprudent’ given the ‘heated discussion’ in the United States about the
League of Nations (154). Fontaine’s position ultimately prevails after the
United States delegation drops its proposal to transfer out the enforcement
as one part of the crucial compromise reached to reduce certain obligations
of governments with federalism (179).
Years later, two negotiators memorialized their recollections regarding
the decision against eliminating the ILO’s enforcement machinery. In 1934,
Edward Phelan explained that ‘it had been thought desirable to have the
machinery in the hands of experts in labor matters’.24 In 1937, Shotwell
observed that ‘it was quite impossible’ to secure the United States amend‑
ment from a Commission ‘the leading members of which had had years of
experience in dealing with evasions of the law’.25
Returning to 1919, the Labour Commission then takes up an amend‑
ment from the French delegation to remove the ‘discretion’ of States in
applying ‘penalties’ in order to give the tribunal’s application of economic
measures ‘a more obligatory character’ (125, 184). This amendment draws
some support, but tougher opposition. For example, Robinson argues that
the existing text already provides ‘sufficient sanction’ (184). The French
amendment is withdrawn.
At the conclusion of the debate, the Labour Commission prepares
its Report presenting the agreed-upon treaty language and a commentary
on that text.26 In editing their report, the Commission agrees to change
24

Edward J. Phelan, ‘The Commission on International Labor Legislation’ in Shotwell
(n 8) vol I, 127, 165. Phelan had been a key author of the Early British Draft and was secretary
of the labour section of the British delegation to the 1919 Peace negotiations. Phelan became
the first civil servant in the ILO and by 1934 had risen to be the Assistant-Director.
25
James T. Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference (Macmillan 1937) 218.
26
The Commission’s report gets rapidly published in 1919; Report of the Commission
on International Labour Legislation of the Peace Conference, American Association of
International Legislation 6 International Conciliation 851-78; see also OB (n 16) 260.
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the title of the descriptive section called ‘Penalties (articles 22 to 34)’ to
‘Enforcement (articles 22 to 34)’ because the word ‘penalties’ is viewed as
‘too strong’ (223, 265). With reference to the ‘economic measures’ in article
33, the Report states:
It will be seen that the above procedure has been carefully devised in
order to avoid the imposition of penalties, except in the last resort,
when a State has flagrantly and persistently refused to carry out its
obligations under a convention. It can hardly be doubted that it will
seldom, if ever, be necessary to bring these powers into operation, but
the Commission consider that the fact of their existence is nevertheless
a matter of almost vital importance to the success of the scheme. The
representatives of the working classes in some countries have pressed
their delegates to urge more drastic provisions in regard to penalties.
The Commission, while taking the view that it will in the long run
be preferable as well as more effective to rely on the pressure of inter‑
national public opinion rather than on economic measures, nevertheless
considers it necessary to retain the possibility of the latter in the back‑
ground. If all forms of sanction were removed, the effectiveness of the
scheme, and, what is almost equally important, the belief in its effect‑
iveness, would be in great measure destroyed (266).
In April 1919, Minister Barnes presents the Labour Commission’s
Report to the Preliminary Peace Conference. He explains that because
there were ‘limitations imposed on States against accepting the decrees of
any super-authority’, the Commission ‘had perforce to give up ideas of uni‑
formity or coercion, and to rely mainly upon the goodwill of States to accept
advice and guidance which might be given to them’ (288). Barnes then
introduces the ILO as having the role ‘to diffuse light in dark places’ with
the ‘effective idea’ of the ILO being ‘creation and mobilisation of healthy
public opinion’ (288-89).27 He goes over the ILO’s main features, including
its ‘enforcement clauses’, and remarks that ‘although the machinery of or‑
ganisation is brought into play, reliance is based on inquiry and publicity’

27

Barnes also enigmatically states: ‘I freely admit that at one time I had a good deal
more faith in penalties but, Sir, closer inspection led me to the conclusion that penalties must
be kept well in the background and can be applied only through the League of Nations and
under the authority of the League of Nations’ (288).
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(291). Barnes closes by noting the expectation that the ‘Peace-makers’ are
going ‘to make industrial as well as military peace’ (292). After some discus‑
sion and minor wording changes, the Preliminary Peace Conference adopts
the Commission’s recommendations for the labour clauses to be inserted
into two Peace treaties as ‘Part XIII Labour’.
At least two of the national parliamentary debates on the Peace Treaty
discuss ILO enforcement and sanctions. When the United States Senate
debates the ratification of the Peace Treaty in fall 1919, several senators
express dismay about the dangers of potential economic sanctions and boy‑
cotts against the United States economy arising from ILO membership.28
By contrast in France, the ILO’s enforcement procedures get criticized for
being too weak. In reporting the Treaty to the French Parliament, Louis
Barthou, a former Prime Minister of France, bemoans that ‘labour had
hoped for and had deserved something more’.29 Barthou goes on to predict
that ‘sooner or later it will be necessary to establish an international code
of labour with executive machinery, compulsory powers and sanctions’.30
The ILO’s enforcement provisions quickly garner the attention of the
legal community. In 1919, former United States Attorney General George
Wickersham explains that ‘machinery is provided whereby a state which
fails to carry out its obligations, or to enforce a convention which has been
ratified, may be subjected to economic measures to compel it to do so’.31
In her lecture to the Grotius Society, Sophy Sanger discusses the authority
of the ILO’s Commission of Enquiry to suggest ‘what economic penalties
might properly be imposed upon the defaulting government’.32
In 1920, an excellent and swiftly-prepared collection of essays about
the ILO is published under the title Labour as an International Problem.
28

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ‘The United States and the International Labor Organization
(1889-1934)’ (unpublished thesis Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 1960) 267–76.
29
Remarks of Justin Godart, a French parliamentarian and government delegate, upon
his election as President of the ILO Conference: International Labour Conference, 18th
Session (1934) 11-12.
30
ibid 12.
31
George W. Wickersham, ‘Labor’ No. 25, (1919) 2(3) World Peace Foundation
Pamphlets 161-162.
32
Sophy Sanger, ‘The International Labour Organisation of the League of Nations’
(1919) 5 Transactions of the Grotius Society 145, 151. Sanger was a British advocate for
labour law reform and the longtime editor of the quarterly journal World’s Labour Laws.
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Several of the essays discuss the ILO’s enforcement system. The editor of
the volume, John Solano, describes the ILO as ‘a wonderful development
for democracy’ and notes how the worker and employer would be enabled
to ‘charge the government of another nation with breach of faith toward its
workers, and if necessary to cause it to be arraigned before the Tribunal of
the League of Nations for judgment which may involve corrective measures
of an economic nature taken against it conjointly by all the member states
of the League’.33 In his essay, Professor Shotwell optimistically observes
that the ‘provision for overseeing the enforcement of labour legislation was
of fundamental importance’ and that this ‘interference in the home life of
the participants in case they do not behave’ is ‘going a long way towards
the breakdown of that conception of sovereignty as absolute which was the
ruinous doctrine upon which the old régime, before the war, was based’.34
Arthur Fontaine writes that while the rules of the ILO ‘make due pro‑
vision for economic measures, moral considerations have been given full
weight, and those responsible for drafting the rules when discussing them,
attached as much importance to moral factors as to definite measures of
enforcement’.35 George Barnes details the treaty procedures wherein the
‘defaulting State’ is given an opportunity of ‘remedying voluntarily any
grievance alleged’ before the ‘punitive economic measures’ and ‘penalties
for default’ may be taken.36
Albert Thomas, a French parliamentarian and Minister of Armament
during the War, is elected to be the Director of the ILO. In his first report
of the Director, Thomas details how the International Labour Office (here‑
inafter ‘Office’) had begun to ready two components of the enforcement
process for ILO conventions: first, the establishment of the panel of per‑
sons of industrial experience who could be appointed to a Commission
of Enquiry; and second, the PCIJ’s rules for its labour jurisdiction.
Although article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provides
33

E. John Solano, ‘Introduction’ in E. John Solano (ed), Labour as an International
Problem (MacMillan, 1920) xiii, li. Solano had served in the British Ministry of Labour.
34
James T. Shotwell, ‘Historical Significance of the International Labour Conference’
in Solano (n 33) 41, 55-56.
35
Arthur Fontaine, ‘A Review of International Labour Legislation’ in Solano (n 33)
161, 185.
36
George N. Barnes, ‘The Scope and Purpose of International Labour Legislation’ in
Solano (n 33) 3, 19-20.
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for the establishment of the PCIJ, the only part of the Treaty of Versailles
that assigns specific duties to the Court are the provisions in Part XIII.
In December 1920, the Council of the League of Nations finalizes the
Statute for the PCIJ which provides several innovative mechanisms to
address the anticipated labour cases. These mechanisms include: a ‘special
chamber’ for labour matters, assistance to the judges by four ‘technical
assessors’ chosen ‘with a view to insuring a just representation of the com‑
peting interests’, and the ‘liberty’ of the Office to furnish the Court with
all relevant information.37
While the drafters of the Statute realized that some of the labour cases
‘may present features which are not of an exclusively legal character’,38 the
Statute evinces no hesitation in the directive that labour cases ‘shall be heard
and determined by the Court’39 Because only States could be parties before
the PCIJ (see Statute article 34), there was a possibility that an appeal to
the Court by a defendant government (see Treaty article 415) would entail
a proceeding in which there was only one party before the Court, espe‑
cially if the complaint came from the ILO Governing Body (see Treaty
article 411). In the absence of any contentious labour case given appellate
review, the Court was never called upon to formulate a standard of review
for that awkward scenario.
In addition to the attention he devotes to the mechanics of the ILO’s
enforcement machinery, Thomas affirms the sanctions in several other
ways. Writing in the first issue of the International Labour Review in
January 1921, the Director states that the ILO ‘may organise inquiries
and undertake inspection and, where necessary, may have recourse to its
sanctions’.40 That month, at the Governing Body, Thomas clarifies that
‘economic action could only be taken with regard to a State which failed
to apply the Convention which it had ratified and not to a State which
37

Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 16 December 1920, 6
League of Nations Treaty Series 390, article 26. Note the interlinking treaty features whereby
Part XIII assigns duties to the PCIJ and the PCIJ Statute assigns duties to the ILO Governing
Body to nominate assessors.
38
League of Nations, Report Submitted to the Third Committee, reprinted in
Alexander P. Fachiri, The Permanent Court of International Justice (Oxford 1925) 312, 316.
39
Statute (n 37) article 26.
40
Albert Thomas, ‘The International Labour Organization. Its Origins, Development
and Future’ (1921) 1 International Labour Review 5.
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had refused to ratify a Convention’.41 He further explains that ‘as regards
the application of general principles [article 427], unless States voluntarily
agreed to apply them, the International Labour Organisation could not, at
present, have recourse to coercive measures’.42 In response to concerns as to
the scope of the competence of the Governing Body, Thomas sagaciously
urges the Governing Body ‘not to bind itself by the adoption of a definite
principle, since it would often be called upon to take decisions which would
involve the making trial of fresh measures without disregard of the text of
the Treaty’.43
In the 1921 report of the Director to the International Labour
Conference, Thomas alludes to potential conflicts between ‘the sanctions
at the disposal of the International Labour Organisation for enforcing agree‑
ments’ and the potential sanctions at the disposal of the League’s International
Blockade Commission.44 Thomas had already communicated with the
Blockade Commission about a potential overlap with the ILO’s ‘economic
sanctions’.45 The Commission had responded that its terms of reference do not
include ‘questions concerning the workers’.46 Thomas also points out in his
Report that the ‘organisation of sanctions [...] comprises all the mechanism
of a legislative or juridical nature placed at the disposal of the International
Labor Organisation’.47 He states that this ‘machinery is already in being
and that it merely remains for the individual States to set it in motion’.48
No motion ensues. In his 1922 report, Thomas writes: ‘there is no doubt
that we are still far from the complete scheme anticipated in the Treaty
of Peace, wherein the system of Conventions which have come into force
is completed by a series of measures of supervision, accompanied if ne‑
cessary by sanctions’.49 Even though still far from use, the sanctions seem
41

Governing Body, sixth session (1921), minutes 25.
ibid.
43
ibid 18.
44
International Labour Conference, third session (1921), Report of the Director,
para 115.
45
ibid para 118.
46
ibid.
47
ibid para 120.
48
ibid.
49
International Labour Conference, fourth session (1922), Report of the Director,
para 89.
42
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real enough to trigger concerns. For example, the 1922 ILO Special Report
on the situation regarding the ratification of the hours Convention looks
at the ratification debate in the Netherlands. During that parliamentary
discussion, the Dutch government expresses worries that ratification ‘affords
no guarantee that other countries will take the same measures’ and yet if
the Netherlands ratifies and then fails to observe its obligations, then the
Dutch economy ‘would become subject to severe sanctions’.50
The novelty of ILO enforcement elicits new scholarship by ILO insiders.
For example, in 1921, Ernest Mahaim, now Belgian Minister of Industry,
Labour and Food and a member of the Governing Body, writes an article
stating after ILO conventions are ratified by legislatures, ‘a system of pen‑
alties guarantees their observation’.51 In 1922, Sophy Sanger, by then the
first chief of the ILO’s Legislative Section, presents a detailed study to the
International Law Association on the topic of the PCIJ and labour cases.52
Sanger anticipates that workers or employers who have ‘become fully alive
to the economic advantages of an international standard of regulation’
will ‘take the initiative in urging their Government to start proceedings
before the Court to induce a competing country faithfully to impose the
same standard’.53
In 1924, the Office prepares a report on several procedural matters
in which ‘sanctions’ are discussed in two contexts.54 First, in explaining
why the Governing Body should not seek to interpret ILO conventions,
the Office warns that if a State has in ‘good faith conformed’ with the
Governing Body’s opinion, the State might nevertheless ‘find itself liable to
sanctions’ if the PCIJ renders a contrary decision, and then the ‘authority of
the Governing Body would be compromised’.55 Second, in considering the
implications of allowing reservations to conventions, the Office points out
how important it is to know when ratifications ‘take full effect’ because at
50

ibid, Appendix XIV 945, 1009, para 59.
Ernest Mahaim, ‘International Labour Law’ (1921) 1 International Labour Review
283, 285.
52
Sophy Sanger, ‘The Permanent Court of International Justice and Labour Cases’
(1922), International Law Association, Report of the 13th conference, vol 1 46-72.
53
ibid 49.
54
International Labour Conference, sixth Session (1924), Report on the institution of
a procedure for amendment of conventions.
55
ibid 44-45.
51
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that point, ratifying countries are subject to prescribed supervision in the
case of non-observance and ‘would be liable to the sanctions prescribed’.56
By the mid-1920s, the ILO’s progressive features generate a new wave of
scholarship. In 1924, George Alexander Johnston comprehensively exam‑
ines the ILO in its social and economic context. Johnston explains that a
State ratifying an ILO convention takes on an obligation of ‘effective obser‑
vance’ and that the ‘due fulfilment by each Government of this responsi‑
bility is intended to be secured by a system of sanctions’.57
Also in 1924, José de Vilallonga, the ILO’s first Legal Adviser, expounds
the law of the ILO in relation to international law.58 While noting that
Part XIII ‘provides for the adoption of measures of an economic char‑
acter against a Member failing to fulfill its obligations’, he explains that
the Organization itself lacks ‘means of international compulsion’ to impose
those economic measures.59 Moreover, neither the Commission of Enquiry
nor the PCIJ have ‘the power to order the adoption of the economic meas‑
ures indicated’.60 Instead, ‘each Member is entirely free to decide’ whether it
will undertake the indicated ‘economic reprisals’.61 The value added is that
Part XIII ‘has certainly modified the common law of reprisal, but only to
the advantage of the Members’ by recognizing that each ILO Member ‘has
the right to take economic reprisals’.62 In addition, Vilallonga postulates
that the ILO’s ‘attributes’ bring it ‘under what has been called administra‑
tive international law’ which he praises as ‘the most modern part’ of ‘the law
of nations’ because it ‘aims at organising the international community’.63
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In that same year, the ILO’s procedure for representations (article 409)
gets its first use. A Japanese seamen’s union lodges a representation that the
Japanese government is not adhering to the Placing of Seamen Convention,
1920 (No. 9). When it considers this representation, the Governing Body
decides not to advance this case to ‘the first stage in the procedure for
enquiry laid down in the Treaty’.64 Decades later, Ernst Haas analyzes this
and other representations in the ILO’s first two decades and concludes that
the Governing Body’s committees were ‘quite ready to accept all sorts of
excuses which, on a rigorous reading of ILO obligations, might not have
been considered germane’.65
In 1925, Edward Harriman undertakes a detailed examination of the
legal aspects of the League, the PCIJ and the ILO.66 Harriman analogizes
that a complaint in the ILO ‘is in the nature of a criminal as distinguished
from a civil action’.67 He explains that after a ‘judgment rendered against
the defaulting Member […] the Court has the power and the duty to fix the
sanction for its own decree’.68
The report of the Director for 1925 hints some impatience at the slow‑
ness in ‘putting into operation the system of mutual supervision’.69 While
‘the machine had been assembled’, writes Thomas, ‘there was no guarantee
that the required current would be forthcoming and that the machine
would be set in motion’.70 The only upside to this lack of motion is that it
gives Thomas a ready answer to criticism that the ILO is not doing enough
on implementation. Thomas asks why, if countries ratifying conventions
are alarmed about ‘competition of neighboring States which have ratified
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Conventions but do not apply them, why do not the former set in motion
the procedure for filing complaints’.71 Calling for ‘a bold and persistent
application of the whole of the machinery created by the Treaty’, Thomas
urges that ‘each Member must exercise its recognized rights, and thus pro‑
mote the common interest of all’.72
In 1926, the Director reiterates the value of the ILO’s complaint system.
Thomas reports that ‘no actions have been taken under articles 411 and
following which govern the procedure for dealing with complaints’; then
he reminds everyone that ‘the machinery is there’ should a Commission
of Enquiry ‘have to be appointed’.73 Thomas avers that a government rati‑
fying an ILO convention acquires ‘moral pressure’ to insist on ‘ratifica‑
tions elsewhere’.74 Showing his sophisticated understanding of the interplay
between social and economic factors, Thomas contrasts the ‘efficacity of a
simultaneous raising of labour standards’ with the ‘ineffectiveness of pro‑
tection by means of tariffs’.75 Thomas also documents the recent labour
Ministerial Conference held in London among five European countries
to come to a common agreement on the interpretation of the Washington
Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1) in order to promote
its ratification. The ‘London Agreement’ of March 1926 provides that the
five governments ‘will not lodge complaints against each other for wrongful
or incomplete application of the Convention’.76
In June 1926, the PCIJ holds a public sitting in an important matter
for the ILO, the advisory opinion on the Competence of the ILO to Regulate,
Incidentally, the Personal Work of the Employer. In a proceeding that is
impossible to imagine in today’s State-centric International Court of Justice,
the PCIJ allows three international non-governmental organizations to
make oral statements to the Court. Although the ILO’s system of enforce‑
ment is not itself at issue in the proceeding, two of those organizations
discuss enforcement as context for interpreting the ILO’s competence.
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Seeking to delineate a narrower role of the ILO, the representative of the
International Organization of Industrial Employers explains that ‘if at any
time a Government fails to carry out its duties’, the actions to be taken
following a Commission of Enquiry ‘lie with the Governments’, and the
Treaty ‘has carefully excluded intervention by the International Labour
Organisation as such’.77 Seeking to demonstrate expanded competence,
the representative of the International Confederation of Christian Trade
Unions points out that the ILO’s authors ‘have not confined themselves
to giving the International Labour Organization strong and effective
rules, they have also provided a procedure including economic sanctions’.78
Commenting a few years later on the role ‘played by private organisations
in international life’ in the PCIJ’s advisory proceedings on labour, Thomas
discerns on the legal horizon ‘the sign of a possible evolution of international
law in a more realistic direction’.79
In his 1927 Report, the Director devotes attention to evolving processes
for supervision of ratified ILO conventions. Referring to the newly-estab‑
lished Committee of Experts, Thomas insists that its work ‘is still only the
beginning of real supervision’ with ‘no immediate sanction behind them’.80
He asserts that ‘the only methods which can be effective are the procedures
of representation and complaint ’.81 Yet he also understands that ‘there are
various difficulties which may prevent industrial organisations from set‑
ting in motion the procedure of representation’.82 As for the prospect of
complaints, Thomas laments that ‘the time has perhaps not yet come when
the different States will have brought home to them afresh the importance
of working conditions in international competition’.83 Thomas submits
that ‘the Office has never had the ingenuous idea that by the magic of the
written word, the whole machinery provided for in the Treaty of Peace can
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be set going at one stroke’ so that ‘the States which are mutually bound
by Conventions will severely supervise one another and set to work the
different procedures provided for, including even decisions of the Court of
Justice and economic sanctions’.84 Looking ahead, Thomas envisions that
complaints and representations ‘will only be set going, when the time comes
for their use, by the development of international life’.85
Thomas continues to champion the complaint process during his
remaining years as Director, but he increasingly warms up to the improved
article 408 process as an alternative to complaints. In 1927, he calls the new
process ‘a kind of first warning publicly given to the States’ which are not
strictly applying a ratified convention.86 In his report of 1928, Thomas ques‑
tions the claims that ratifying governments take ‘liberties’ with conventions
in practice, and asks why the authors of such claims have ‘not set in motion
the procedure of complaint’.87 In 1929, Thomas lauds the ‘considerable pro‑
gress’ in utilizing article 408 reports, and suggests that ‘it is perhaps for this
very reason’ that there are not any ‘cases of the opening of the procedure
of representation or complaint’.88 In 1931, Thomas accords more credit to
the new process. While admitting that ‘it is true that the machinery of
supervision and sanctions has as yet scarcely been utilised’, Thomas points
out that ‘it is misleading to keep alleging that ratified Conventions are not
being enforced’ because ‘exceptions’ to enforcement ‘are being dealt with
and are disappearing’ through the article 408 processes.89
In 1929, as part of the ongoing discussion of the revision of ILO
conventions, H.C. Ørsted, a Danish employer delegate and director of
the Nordic employers federation, writes a memo to the ILO’s Standing
Orders Committee analyzing the legal character of the ratification of an
ILO convention. According to Ørsted, this legal character is an obligation
‘with respect to the Organisation’, not the ‘legal character of reciprocity’.90
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Ørsted reaches this conclusion, in part, because of the exclusive power of
the Governing Body ‘to adopt the procedure of enquiry which may lead
to the adoption of economic sanctions against a State Member which fails
to fulfil the obligations resulting from the ratification of a Convention’.91
Later that year, Mahaim authors an article for the Revue de Droit
International et de Législation Comparée in which he responds to Ørsted’s
thesis.92 In Mahaim’s view, that the obligations of ILO conventions are
towards the Organization does not preclude that such obligations can sim‑
ultaneously be towards other States parties. Mahaim reasons that the Berne
labour conventions of 1906 were mutual obligations ‘although without
sanctions’.93 The Peace Treaty, says Mahaim, is intended ‘to improve on
the methods inaugurated at Berne’ through the creation of the Permanent
Organization with its new processes ‘and, finally, the sanctions’.94 But these
improvements are supplemental to the underlying mutual obligations, not
a replacement for them. Mahaim sees the sanctions as an important part
of the improvements achieved in 1919 with the Organization having ‘the
whole system of sanctions placed in its hands’.95 Indeed, the ‘procedure
of sanctions’ appears to be so central to Mahaim’s ontology that he views
the sanctions as evidencing an ‘abdication of sovereignty on the part of
the Members’.96
In 1929, a book by Charles Howard-Ellis details the ILO’s complaint
procedure and explains that it is ‘very carefully devised in a series of grad‑
uated steps’ starting with the Governing Body and ending with ‘the actual
operation of economic coercion to secure compliance’.97 Ellis, a sometime
British intelligence officer, observes that ‘public opinion has proved exceed‑
ingly efficient in inducing governments to live up to conventions once
ratified, and no suggestion has been made of resorting to more stringent
91
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measures’.98 In his view, ‘it is doubtful whether a case will ever occur of this
procedure being applied to the end’.99
In 1929-30, P.P. Pillai, the first and longtime director of the ILO’s
branch office in New Delhi, delivers a series of lectures about the ILO.100
One lecture discusses the ILO’s enforcement process and notes that any
ILO member ‘can enforce against the recalcitrant state the punitive eco‑
nomic measures set out either in the report of the Commission of Enquiry
or in the Court’s final order’.101 Pillai observes that ‘it has sometimes been
argued that international supervision over ratified Conventions cannot but
be perfunctory and that the economic sanctions referred to would hardly, if
ever, be resorted to’.102 Pillai disagrees, suggesting instead that the sanctions
would be resorted to.
In a 1931 monograph chronicling the ILO’s first decade, the Office
points out that the ILO has ‘a complete system of procedure for com‑
plaints, enquiries and sanctions which occupies no fewer than ten Articles
of Part XIII’.103 The monograph goes on to explain that:
the system is clearly inspired by a desire to delay the application of sanc‑
tions as long as possible, so as to allow the State implicated to justify
itself at every stage of the procedure or to fulfil its obligations under the
Convention. The sanctions provided, moreover, are of a purely economic
nature, and the power of imposing them rests with the Permanent
Court of International Justice.104
In addition, the Office points out that if the Governing Body were to
publish a representation, ‘all the States Members would be given the op‑
portunity, if they thought fit, to make a formal complaint, and so to open
the procedure for enquiry and sanctions’.105
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In 1931, the Governing Body takes up several interconnected issues
involving the supervisory process. To better inform these discussions, the
Governing Body had requested a study of the status of article 411 complaints.
The ensuing legal study by the Office restates the authority of Conference
delegates to lodge a complaint, and clarifies that the Governing Body enjoys
‘wide’ freedom and ‘discretion’ in addressing complaints and in deciding
whether to authorize a Commission of Enquiry.106 With regard to the rules
for representations in the Standing Orders, the Governing Body had tasked
a Committee to consider needed revisions. During debate within that
Committee on a draft prepared by the Office, a participant had remarked that
since the ‘term sanction was not specifically referred to in the Treaty, it was
not desirable to make use of it in the Standings Orders’.107 In late 1931, the
Governing Body adopts new Standing Orders for handling representations
that provide for a confidential consideration within the Governing Body
until there is a decision as to what to do about the representation, including
the possibility of proceeding to a complaint.108 The term ‘sanction’ is omitted.
In 1932, a question arises as to whether the ratification of an ILO con‑
vention by a non-Member of the ILO would make that country ‘liable to
the sanctions laid down in the Treaty of Peace’.109 At the time, the United
States is still a non-member. A legal analysis by the Office concludes that
a non-member State ratifying an ILO convention ‘would in effect involve
acceptance ad hoc of certain of the provisions of Part XIII concerning super‑
vision and sanctions with respect to the application of Conventions’.110
Albert Thomas dies suddenly in May 1932 and is succeeded by Deputy
Director Harold Butler. Butler had begun his service to the ILO on the
Labour Commission drafting Part XIII. Thomas himself was not a drafter,
and that status may have better enabled him to transform the nascent ILO
into a ‘living’111 institution energetic and adept enough to earn its way
through the tumultuous decades ahead.
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All of the documentation I have been able to collect suggests that
Thomas believes in the importance of the complaint process and does all
he can to put that system into operation. Although Thomas is surely aware
of the critical views (discussed below) about the ILO’s machinery for sanc‑
tions, nothing in any of his writings or actions suggests that he objects to
the possibility of sanctions if a complaint is verified and proves unsuccessful
in remedying the treaty default. On the contrary, for Thomas, the sanctions
‘placed at the disposal of the International Labour Organisation’ are an
integral part of his vision for a successful ILO. As he explained in 1922
(quoted above), the system of conventions is ‘completed’ by supervision and
‘if necessary by sanctions’.112
In October 1932, the Governing Body considers the question of what
should be done about situations where article 408 reports fail to produce
adequate results. Tom Moore, the Canadian worker delegate, proposes
that ‘there should be some intermediate step’ between observations ‘and
the application of sanctions under the Treaty’.113 Léon Jouhaux interjects
that ‘it was certain that the Office would soon reach the stage at which it
would have to take certain responsibilities regarding the application of the
sanctions provided by the Treaty’.114 This discussion of sanctions is brought
to a close by Butler, the new Director, who declares that ‘if it were found
that, in spite of all the observations made, certain States persisted in not
applying the Conventions they had ratified, it would be necessary to con‑
template the application of sanctions’.115 So, as Butler begins his six years of
service as Director, he does not initially express any differences in his views
on sanctions from the long-time support for the possibility of sanctions
expressed by Thomas from 1920 through 1931.
The March 1933 issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science is devoted to the ILO whose cutting-edge enforcement
system is discussed and praised in several of the 24 essays. Jean Morellet, the
ILO’s second legal adviser, points out ‘the important distinction in methods
of application between International Labor conventions and ordinary
112
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international Conventions, for the application of the former is subject to a
procedure of supervision and sanctions which is regulated in great detail by
the [Peace] Treaties’.116 Joseph Chamberlain, a law professor at Columbia
University, calls attention to the ILO’s ‘provision for economic sanctions
against a recalcitrant state’.117 Charles Pipkin, a professor of political science
at Louisiana State University, takes note of the provisions ‘providing sanc‑
tions for the observation of labor treaties’.118 Shotwell describes Part XIII
as ‘having a long series of provisions for the international punishment of
any state not living up to its agreement under the treaty’.119
One of the essayists, Francis Graham Wilson, writes specifically on
the topic of enforcement of international labour standards.120 At that time,
Wilson is a 32-year old professor of political science at the University of
Washington who had received a fellowship to spend a year in Geneva (193132) to write a book about the ILO. Over a lengthy academic career, Wilson
becomes an eminent political scientist known for his writings on conservatism
and public opinion. I will discuss Wilson’s thesis on ILO enforcement in the
context of his ‘controversial’ book about the ILO published in late 1934.121

III. The fall of ILO sanctions
The rejection of the ILO’s sanctions commences as the ink dries on the
Peace Treaties. In July 1919, after noting the availability of ‘measures of an
economic character prepared to compel compliance’, George Wickersham
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suggests that the ILO should act more like the League of Nations in placing
reliance ‘upon the effect of discussion, interchange of opinion and sugges‑
tion, than upon coercion, to accomplish the beneficent ends in view’.122
George Barnes, in his 1920 essay quoted above, proclaims that ‘it is im‑
portant to eliminate from the scheme, as far as possible, coercive measures to
enforce the observance of the conventions’123 Instead, Barnes suggests that
‘national honour, public opinion, [and] the moral obligations of good faith
and diplomacy should be relied upon, and should almost invariably suffice
to secure the observance of conventions, provided that they are practicable
and based upon justice and good reason’.124
In 1924, Beddington Behrens points out that while the Treaty of
Versailles ‘lays down various forms of coercion’ should the terms of an
ILO convention not be applied, those provisions are ‘of no present prac‑
tical importance’.125 He goes on to explain: ‘one can hardly conceive, in the
present state of the world, of a general economic boycott of a country, espe‑
cially if it was one of the large Powers, for failure to observe some clause in
a labour convention it had ratified’.126 Instead, Behrens postulates that the
ILO’s ‘strength must reside in its power to appeal to international public
opinion’ rather than in ‘the threat of armies or of economic boycott’.127
By 1926, there is growing discomfort with the sanctions in the ILO
Constitution. In his address upon being elected President of the ILO’s
1926 Conference, Monseigneur Nolens points to the ILO’s ‘system of inter‑
national supervision and sanctions’ and calls attention to how ‘the enforce‑
ment of Conventions’ applies only to ratifying countries.128 Nolens voices
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concern that this potential enforcement ‘may in itself be to Members who
have not ratified a further ground for not ratifying in a hurry’.129 In his trea‑
tise on the ILO, Paul Périgord observes that in complaints being considered
by a Commission of Enquiry or the PCIJ, ‘abundant provision is made for
the defaulting state to remedy any grievance alleged against it before any
question of penalty can arise’.130 Périgord adds that the drafters of the ILO
procedures ‘did not believe in coercive measures’ to ‘secure the observance of
the conventions’, but instead relied upon ‘national honor, public sentiment,
international moral sense, and friendly representations’ which ‘should prove
sufficient’.131 Périgord may be the originator of the myth that the ILO’s
founders did not believe in coercive measures.132
The ILO Conference of June 1926 features a spirited discussion of
the sanctions in the ILO system. The context is the decision to estab‑
lish what is now called the Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR). The Office had prepared
a note explaining that the ‘functions of the Committee of Experts would
be entirely technical and in no sense judicial’.133 The note clarifies that the
proposed system of examination ‘is not in any way concerned with the
machinery of enquiry and of sanctions’ and its operation ‘is not based upon
complaints’.134 During the debate on setting up the Committee of Experts,
Mahaim (now a longtime Belgian government delegate) points out that
‘formal complaints’ are a ‘serious step’ that can lead to an ‘official inquiry’
which can make possible the ‘system of sanctions’ including ‘a financial and
economic blockade of a defaulting State’.135 Mahaim suggests that such sanc‑
tions should be reserved only for cases that are ‘scandalous’.136 For the rest of
the cases, Mahaim explains that the Peace Treaty provides an ‘intermediate
129
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system’ based on the annual reports of governments.137 Both the Office and
Mahaim are conceptualizing a distinction between two alternative methods
of managing treaty implementation. As Mahaim sees it, the Peace Treaty
‘organises a system of control separate from the system of sanctions’.138
Right after Mahaim’s reference to a ‘blockade’, Belgium’s worker del‑
egate Corneille Mertens jumps in. Noting ‘the possible result of an eco‑
nomic blockade’ on the ILO-defaulting country, Mertens protests: ‘I do not
like such measures, and I hope they will not be taken, but that any defect
with respect to application will be met by other means’.139 Still, Mertens
is dubious of ‘the argument that any such system [of sanctions] will lead
to difficulties in ratification’ because ‘for the most part this argument is
brought forward by countries which do not wish to ratify’.140
This discussion of sanctions provokes an intervention from Sir Joseph
Cook. Cook is an Australian government delegate who had once been
Prime Minister and was one of the plenipotentiaries in Paris who received
the report of the Labour Commission. Cook retorts that the ILO was never
intended to
be a court to wield a big stick and go about with a blackthorn to
flagellate nations which were recalcitrant. It was intended to be an
Organisation where reason and persuasion and public opinion should
be enthroned. It was proposed to gather the facts and let in the light of
public opinion upon them. That, I venture to say, will in the long run,
perhaps prove the best sanction of all – the most effective and the most
likely to give the best results.141
In June 1934, the ILO is given its first opportunity to ‘open the pro‑
cedure’ for a Commission of Enquiry. This opportunity arises during the
ILO’s 1934 Conference when the Indian worker delegate, Jamnadas M.
Mehta, the President of the National Trades Union Federation and the AllIndia Railwaymen’s Federation, decries India’s failure to apply the Hours
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of Work (Industry) Convention to half of the railway workers.142 Even as
a first-time delegate, Mehta (who is a barrister) understands his rights and
invokes his complaint ‘as a Delegate from India’.143 He asks ‘the Governing
Body to have a Commission of Enquiry appointed’.144
To his disadvantage, Mehta neglects to line up some allies for his ini‑
tiative. And his timing is poor. Mehta lodges his complaint at the end of
the discussion of article 408 reports, and just before the eagerly awaited
announcement that the United States Government is now ready to be
invited to join the ILO.
Notwithstanding the bad timing, Mehta’s initiative should have been
celebrated by the Conference as a long-awaited institutional achievement
for the ILO. Yet no celebration occurs. Mehta’s announcement draws a
quick rejection from A.G. Clow, an Indian government delegate. Clow
rebukes Mehta for bringing up a ‘domestic dispute’ and showing ‘ignorance’
because, as Clow puts it, ‘those of you who are familiar with the Treaty, will
of course, know that it is only [...] Member States, and not “members” of
the Conference who “have the right” to make effective applications under’
article 411.145 On the substance, Clow points out that the Committee of
Experts ‘has never expressed the view’ put forward by Mehta regarding
defects in India’s implementation of the Convention.146
As soon as he can get recognized, P.J.S. Serrarens, the worker delegate
from The Netherlands and longtime Secretary-General of the International
Federation of Christian Trade Unions, stands up to Clow. Serrarens appre‑
ciates the historical significance of Mehta’s bold move. Serrarens states that
he is ‘glad that the Indian Workers’ delegate has invoked the procedure laid
down in article 411 et seq. of the Treaty of Peace’.147 In riposte, Serranens
points out that Clow ‘himself was in error’ regarding Mehta’s rights.148
Soon afterward, a British government delegate seeks to end the discussion
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and notes that the Governing Body will consider Mehta’s complaint ‘in
due course’.149
Due course occurs behind closed doors. In September 1934, the
Governing Body takes up Mehta’s complaint in a private sitting.150 Then
in early 1935, in another private sitting, the Governing Body adopts a
resolution expressing ‘hopes’ that the ‘benefits of the Convention will be
extended at an early date to such workers on Indian railways as do not yet
enjoy them’.151 Because the Governing Body debates Mehta’s public com‑
plaint in a private sitting, there is no transparency as to what considerations
led to the negative determination. Although article 411 gives the Governing
Body the discretion to decide whether a Commission of Enquiry is needed,
the circumstances of this complaint warrant an affirmative decision of the
Governing Body made in a public session.152 The criticism that I express
here parallels that of Professor Haas who pungently states that ‘instead of
appointing the Commission of Inquiry foreseen in the Constitution, the
Governing Body in effect used the representation procedure in order to
exonerate the British authorities’.153
Wilson’s 1934 treatise presents a detailed description of the ILO’s
enforcement mechanism and offers numerous valuable insights.154 Wilson
coins a great name, the ‘Commission of Verification’, for the inventive and
precedential article 420 procedures to lift sanctions (223).155 He appreciates
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the significance of the ILO’s alternative to unilateral reprisal by placing
‘in the hands of an international body the supervision and evaluation of
enforcement’ (231). He grasps how ‘unique’ ILO enforcement is and shows
that the League of Nations has no parallel means of enforcement of its
conventions because sanctions in the League apply only to ‘political issues’
rather than to ‘questions of social co-operation’ (221, 230-231).
Yet despite all of the legal progress in the ILO’s enforcement system,
Wilson denounces the sanctions:
If one consults the minutes of the Peace Conference Commission which
drafted Part XIII, one will find there a high regard for ‘sanctions’. It
seems utterly absurd now that sensible members of that Commission
could have believed that an economic blockade might be instituted
by the Powers simply because, let us say, one country allowed more
hours of work than are permitted by the Washington hours convention
(217). The plain fact is that the Labor Organization is functioning in
a world of nationalistic realism which admits of no teeth to Part XIII.
States have more sanctions against the Labor Organization than the
Labor Organization has against the states (218). Although the Peace
Conference made heroic attempts to provide sanctions for international
labor law, none in fact was assured. Sanctions machinery is to be found
in Part XIII, but the international situation does not permit it to be
endowed with life (241).
After several pages of like criticism, Wilson announces the burial of the
ILO’s sanctions. He writes that beyond articles 408 and 409, the rest of the
‘measures of control’ are ‘likely to become a dead letter, while remaining a
testimonial to the mentality of the Peace Conference’ (221). Wilson explains
that up ‘to 1932 at least’, the position of the Office has been ‘that there are
genuine sanctions for the enforcement of the international law of labor’
(220). Yet, as he completes his book in October 1934, Wilson predicts:
‘the chances are now that there will be no further references to sanctions
in the documents of the Organization’ (219). In addition, he observes that
‘the Office seems to recognize that if the Governing Body should proceed
beyond the mere consideration of a complaint, it would be faced with the
future abstention of a member from its work, and perhaps the denunciation
of a Convention or perhaps all of the conventions which the particular state
in question has ratified’ (220).
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In summary, Wilson declares that ‘the governments are unwilling to
register complaints; the Governing Body is unwilling to set the machinery
of enforcement in motion on its own initiative; and trade unions, it seems,
have not been interested in filing representations against their govern‑
ments’ (230).156 Why are governments not filing complaints? To Wilson,
‘the obvious reluctance of the governments to resort to [the] enforcement
procedure is understandable’ (230) because ‘it is not likely that such steps
would result in the better enforcement of the convention and it would likely
provide grounds for future retaliation by the same means’ (230).
Wilson’s prediction proves correct as to the cessation of the ILO’s refer‑
ences to ‘sanctions’. Once Albert Thomas is gone, no ILO Director-General
mentions sanctions or even the complaint process in his annual report until
1950. After 1932, sanctions are only rarely mentioned in ILO bodies until
a new debate commences around 1945 on the ILO’s constitutional reforms.
One such mention occurs in 1936 when Léon Jouhaux, the French workers
representative, advises the Governing Body that ‘sanctions’ have never been
applied because ‘it was felt that to apply them would have the effect of pre‑
venting Governments from ratifying Conventions’.157
Scholarly references to sanctions likewise diminish. In 1937, Jean
Zarras authors a comprehensive juridical study of the machinery for super‑
vising the application of ILO conventions. Zarras explains how mutual
supervision through annual reports has supplanted the formal procedures
of representation and complaints. He engages in an extensive analysis of
complaints and sanctions and points out numerous problems in applying
sanctions, such as the absence of certainty that all States will apply the sanc‑
tions. Furthermore, Zarras suggests that rigorously applying the sanction
procedure would weaken the ‘moral force’ of the ILO.158 In 1938 when
Serrarens explains that the ILO Constitution provides for commissions of
inquiry and ‘the possibility of economic sanctions’; then, in understatement,
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Serrarnes observes that this ‘severe machinery of supervision did not become
the usual method of international administration’ in the ILO.159 What
happens instead, in my own view, was that the decentralized complaint
process, which was originally intended to be a regular method of adminis‑
tration, got left behind in favor of a more centralized and upgraded review
process. At some point in time, the new process gets renamed the ‘regular’
supervisory system, while the complaint process is recharacterized as one
of the ‘special procedures’.160
Looking now at Wilson’s trenchant analysis, one can see that he presci‑
ently announces the moment in which the ILO discards its trade sanctions.
Wilson is right in detecting the sharp mood swing against sanctions. Wilson
is right in forecasting that when the Governing Body receives its first com‑
plaint (the India railway case that concludes in February 1935), its response
will be capped at ‘mere consideration’. How does Wilson so shrewdly antici‑
pate the ILO’s philosophical rejection of its own trade sanctions? My hunch
is that Wilson applies his skills as a political theorist to the insights he gains
mingling with ILO insiders.161 There may also be a Wilson Effect.

IV. The contemporary significance of the demise of ILO sanctions
Why are the trade sanctions not deployed between 1919 and 1934? The
simplest answer is that no complaints are lodged until Mehta’s failed move.
Without complaints, there cannot be any sanctions. As Albert Thomas
signals in 1927, complaints would get going only at the right time in the
‘development of international life’. As it turns out, international life does
not welcome an ILO complaint for decades to come.
While the absence of complaints explains why there are no sanctions,
could it also be that the availability of ILO sanctions explains why there
are no complaints? Perhaps. Yet even Wilson does not blame the sanc‑
tions. Instead, Wilson suggests that governments are unwilling to register
complaints because of the ‘international situation’ and worries about
159
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counter-complaints. Moreover, if the availability of sanctions is the key
factor blocking complaints, then the so-called elimination of sanctions in
1946 should have opened the floodgates to complaints. Although the details
of the ILO’s 1946 constitutional amendment are outside the temporal scope
of my essay, Haas in 1964 expresses the conventional wisdom that because
of the amendment, ‘the possibility of sanctions no longer exists’.162 Yet in
the long period between 1946 and 1960, the ILO’s now sanction-free com‑
plaint process remains inactive.
The workers might have been less worried about counter-complaints
than governments and yet workers, too, withhold complaints. Recalling
the concerns of worker delegate Mertens in 1926 about an ILO-related
‘economic blockade’, one can speculate that workers were not attracted to
a process that could lead to trade sanctions on the fruits of their labour.
Consistent with my speculation, a longtime ILO official has observed that
workers have traditionally ‘taken the view that the application of sanctions
to countries which violated standards was not part of ILO culture’.163
My own guess is that workers did not file complaints because they
doubted that a complaint could succeed. In the ILO’s first two decades,
the process for worker representations looks futile.164 Moreover, the dis‑
appointing treatment given by the Governing Body to Mehta’s complaint
probably reinforces doubts as to the ILO’s commitment to its complaint
process. Indeed, when Wilson reports that Mehta has filed the first com‑
plaint in the ILO, Wilson discerns that the ‘handling of this problem will
be of great interest to observers of the enforcement machinery’.165
As noted above, the ILO’s sanctions are given only superficial atten‑
tion in literature about the ILO. This pattern of omission does not apply
to Professor Haas who is among the leading scholars of the ILO during
the 1960s. But although Haas takes account of the ILO’s sanctions, some
of his conclusions are questionable. Insofar as studies of the ILO offer an
162
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explanation as to why the sanctions go unused, one explanation we see is
that the ILO’s enforcement process lacked its own volition and was being
controlled by the League.166 This explanation is sometimes footnoted
to Haas who argued that ‘the consent of the Council of the League of
Nations was required to initiate serious sanctions; the League controlled
the ILO pursestrings’.167
In my view, the argument that the League prevented the ILO from
using its sanctions is erroneous. Writing during the era of the League,
Wilson debunks what he calls the ‘conservative view’ that sanctions ‘are
measures which are to be taken by the League of Nations through the
Secretary-General and not by the Organization at all’.168 Instead, Wilson
insists, correctly, that if the Governing Body applies for a Commission of
Enquiry, ‘there is no discretion left the Secretary General as to whether or
not this commission shall be established’.169 Furthermore, any suggestion
that the political capacity of the League set a ceiling for the political capacity
of the ILO overlooks the fundamental point that, unlike the League, the
ILO enjoys the benefits of tripartism. From his vantage point in studying
both the League and the ILO, Smith Simpson, in 1941, observes that tri‑
partism gives the ILO ‘an element of strength, of vigor, of independent
criticism which the League never had’.170
Some of the sources quoted in my essay (e.g., Solano 1920 and
ILO 1931) can be read to suggest that the role of the Court as the final
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adjudicator of trade sanctions meant that the sanctions belonged to the
Court, rather than to the ILO. And if so, then the ILO never possessed
any sanctions to use or not to use. The problem with this assertion is that
the Court had the same independence from the League as it did from the
ILO. Alternatively, as Professor Harriman explains, one should view the
Court as being a part of both the ILO and the League.171 Either way, the
existence of independent judicial review does not transfer agency regu‑
latory authority to the courts.
Another explanation Haas gives for the non-use of sanctions is that
‘neither the Office nor the Governing Body ever took the enforcement pro‑
cedure very seriously’.172 Haas cites no evidence backing up his claim. By
contrast, my essay stacks up considerable evidence that refutes his claim. My
essay reports numerous statements about sanctions made within the ILO
and in the writings by ILO officials.173 Besides, if no one took sanctions
very seriously, why was so much intellectual energy devoted to pushing back
against sanctions beginning in 1919 and culminating in the sharp critique
Wilson paints in 1934? And why the London Agreement of 1926 to forego
government-sponsored complaints?
The history presented here shows that it would not be accurate to sug‑
gest that neither the framers of the ILO nor the ILO’s early leadership ever
seriously contemplated that the sanctions would be used. On the other
hand, the history shows a conviction of many of the ILO’s framers and
early leaders that sanctions would be reserved and should be reserved only
for a severe breakdown in compliance. Recall statements to that effect by
Fontaine (1919), the Labour Commission (1919), Barnes (1919), Mahaim
(1926), Ellis (1929), and Butler (1932).174
Based on experience with the use of sanctions in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) over the past 25 years, let me offer a new hypothesis
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as to why the ILO community was so reluctant to open the door to com‑
plaints and sanctions. The problem is that the original ILO Constitution
did not provide ‘scales of penalties’ (Vandervelde) to be applied in order to
avoid ‘excessive penalty’ (Early British Draft). The existence of this unguided
missile of ILO penalties explains why participants were expressing worries
about ‘severe sanctions’ (Dutch Government), ‘a general economic boycott’
(Behrens), a ‘financial and economic blockade’ (Mahaim), and an ‘economic
blockade’ (Mertens and Wilson). Such aggressive remedies seem out of the
question today, but that is only because we have become conditioned to
deploying sanctions only against threats to peace. Back in 1919 apparently,
the use of an economic blockade to uphold worker rights was not so obvi‑
ously a nonstarter.
In my view, had the sanctions process advanced to the point where a
Commission of Enquiry or the PCIJ needed to indicate ‘appropriate’ eco‑
nomic measures (articles 414 and 418), then legal standards for appropri‑
ateness would have developed through caselaw. The PCIJ would have had
before it any recommendations on economic measures by the Commission
of Enquiry and could have sought views of the parties and the assessors as
to the level and type of sanction to ‘indicate’. Then some proportionality
principle could have been applied to quantify the sanctions indicated.
Nevertheless, reasonable observers in the 1920s were justified in wor‑
rying about the unpredictability of the ILO’s economic measures. In the
absence of any prescribed limitation on sanctions, the ILO’s complaint
machinery was Pandora’s box. What would be the point of rolling the dice
with ILO sanctions if Wilson were right that ‘States have more sanctions
against the Labor Organization than the Labor Organization has against
the states’?
As the sanctions for labour convention enforcement atrophy from
disuse, the ILO recovers by growing new supervisory tissue. Wilson may
be the first commentator to describe the ILO as an Organization with ‘no
teeth’. Yet, when Wilson pens those words, the ILO still has teeth. Wilson’s
key intellectual contribution is that the ILO’s teeth can be pulled because
persuasion is a much more powerful instrument of the Organization
than force, as is exemplified in the possible sanctions provided in the
Treaty of Peace. Thus, the Organization becomes an agent for the for‑
mation of public opinion, for the cultivation of the international sense
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of right, and an instrumentality for the shaping of those attitudes in the
various states which make possible the passage of social legislation.175
It is Wilson who ushers in the ILO’s first constitutional moment in
which the law of control is transformed from hard to soft measures without
formal constitutional revision. A capacity for such institutional change
is a hallmark of the ILO. Looking back at the first half-century of ILO
practice, C. Wilfred Jenks observes in 1969 that ‘the spirit of the system’
is that ‘constitutional arrangements’ are ‘treated as the starting point of a
process of continuing growth’.176 As instituted by the framers in 1919, the
ILO’s sanctions exist side-by-side with the ‘pressure of international public
opinion’ (Labour Commission) and the ‘moral factors’ (Fontaine). Then, in
the reconceptualization of ILO supervision, as initiated by Barnes in 1920,
the coercive measures are fingered for elimination.
Wiping out the trade sanctions is accomplished through a new philos‑
ophy of implementation. This informal constitutional amendment reflects
a belief that compliance with ILO conventions is more fruitfully promoted
without sanctions through the power of ‘suggestion’ (Wickersham) and
‘friendly representations’ (Périgord). In 1926, Sir Joseph Cook formulates
what becomes the modern theory of ILO implementation by rejecting the
ILO’s ‘big stick’ in favour of ‘reason and persuasion’ that would be ‘more
likely to give the best results’ than sanctions.
Several years afterward, Wilson sharpens ILO theory by recognizing
how various mechanisms enable the ILO to be ‘an agent’ and ‘an instrumen‑
tality for the shaping’ of attitudes in the various States and enable the ILO
‘to lead and not merely to follow opinion’.177 Comparing the two options,
Wilson pronounces that ‘persuasion is a much more powerful instrument of
the Organization than force’. In other words, the ILO could now disavow
its sanctions because the ILO believed it had paved a better path.
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The original ILO Constitution featured a two-prong implementation
system: to secure State consent to an ILO convention, the Constitution
relied only upon persuasion. But to combat non-compliance with a ratified
ILO convention, the Constitution provided sanctions. Those are the sanc‑
tions discontinued in the ILO’s constitutional moment with a recalibration
of means to ends.
In the ILO’s normative revamp, compliance with ratified conventions
is to be promoted only with persuasion mediated through supervisory pro‑
cesses. The ILO disengages its sanctions because the sanctions are thought
to militate against the goal of national implementation due to the contra‑
diction of seeking to compel a country to do what is putatively in its self-in‑
terest. Even the term ‘pressure’ becomes too harsh for the ILO’s ears. In
1970, the staff veteran George Johnston confides that the ‘word pressure is
never used in the ILO. Nevertheless, influence can be, and is, exercised’.178
Utilizing influence without pressure constitutes a coherent approach.
The excision of the sanctions from the ILO’s implementation system
does not render the remaining managerial system the best of all possible
worlds. The ILO gave up a technique that was unique and then placed too
much confidence in ‘moral factors’ (Fontaine), ‘moral obligations of good
faith’ (Barnes), ‘international public opinion’ (Behrens), ‘national honor’
(Périgord), ‘the light of public opinion’ (Cook), ‘public opinion’ (Ellis), and
‘persuasion’ (Wilson) as a sufficient means to achieve compliance. Had the
first ILO complaints launched much earlier in international life, the tale of
the ILO’s sanctions might have been different.
A successful scenario is imaginable for how ILO sanctions might have
been used to confront scandalous non-compliance in a democratic country.
As David Hunter Miller hypothesized in 1921 in a discussion of the ‘sanc‑
tions’ in the ‘Labor Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles’, ‘no State could afford
to reject a public decision of the International Court that it was not fulfiling
an agreement made for the benefit primarily of its own people’.179 To my
knowledge, no one has ever conducted interactive simulation games of the
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ILO’s trade sanctions to test the prospect of successful sanction scenarios
against scofflaw countries. Looking back from today, I believe that Wilson
underestimates the power of international law processes to remedy govern‑
ment misbehaviour, especially with the filip of trade measures ‘against the
articles produced under the conditions of unfair competition proved to
exist’ (British Draft).
Nevertheless, in the big picture, Wilson got it right: the sanctions were
too heavy-handed for the ILO. One can easily imagine the frustration of
an ILO official trying to explain to developing countries why signing on to
a convention is voluntary, yet improperly administering the convention is
sanctionable. The ILO needed a softer touch. By dismantling the sanctions,
the ILO’s two-engine system could be remodeled into a simpler design
relying only on the engine of persuasion and tripartism.
When sanctions have worked in international organizations as catalysts
for treaty compliance – most notably in the trading system – the context is
an organization where one set of rules applies to all member governments.
The key structural difference between ILO law and WTO law is not that
the topic of the ILO is labour while the topic of the WTO is trade. Rather,
the key structural difference between WTO rules and ILO conventions is
that (most of) the WTO’s substantive rules are membership obligations,
while the ILO’s substantive rules are á la carte options.
In 1995, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes co-authored an influen‑
tial book titled The New Sovereignty about compliance with international
regulatory agreements. The book contends that ‘sanctioning authority by
treaty’ is ‘rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when used’.180
Instead, in the ‘theory of compliance’ they put forward, compliance is pro‑
moted by a process of ‘persuasion’ that is ‘essentially managerial rather than
enforcement’.181 The book’s analysis distinguishes an enforcement model
from a managerial model, and then documents the adoption and use of
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intergovernmental managerial processes to promote compliance without
formal enforcement.182
Chayes and Chayes report that the ‘roots of this development can
be traced at least as far back as the early days of the International Labor
Organization’.183 Yet the headwaters of the rejection of hard enforce‑
ment – the sidelining of ILO sanctions in the early 1930s – is completely
absent from the Chayes and Chayes book even though that episode would
have provided strong evidence for their thesis. When the ‘Chayeses’ trace the
root to the ILO, the ILO practice they dig back to is the limited use of the
ILO’s machinery for complaints and the establishment of the CEACR.184
The New Sovereignty does not mention the ILO’s sanctions.
The Chayeses miss the big story about how the ILO pushes back against
its trade sanctions because that neglected history does not appear in the
international law and international relations literature they draw upon.
Because the two story lines presented in my essay are so little known, the
ILO has not received any credit for its volitional move to disconnect its
trade sanctions. The mangled account given in the Director-General’s 1994
report quoted above185 leaves the false impression that no change occurs
because the ILO has always lacked sanctions.
Let me draw it all together by quoting the most famous sentence in 19th
century legal scholarship. In 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote that
‘the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience’.186 The story of
the ILO’s sanctions provides a good illustration of this maxim. The original
ILO Constitution’s provision on sanctions is based on the straightforward
logic that ILO conventions need enforcement to prevent self-interested
defection.187 Although an aversion to the ILO’s trade sanctions materializes
by 1920, the expendability of sanctions becomes apparent only after the ILO
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gains experience year after year without a need for the sanctions originally
thought to be logically necessary. By 1934, ILO’s trade sanctions could be
ejected from the life of the law because the ILO was moving forward with
a less confrontational strategy for implementation.
I would like to believe that the reformation of ILO practice to abandon
the trade sanctions would have gained the approval of Albert Thomas who
was never fearful to make ‘trial of fresh measures’. Ever the apostle of inter‑
nationalism, Thomas is eager to teach the lesson that ‘international life, after
all, is something new and still in an embryonic stage; it can only really be
created and developed by practice’.188
As it embarks upon its second century, the ILO should reunite with
its lost history.
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